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Employment Impact of Fringe Benefits 
in Canadian Manufacturing Sector: 1957-1965 
Syed M. A. Hameed 
The paper analyzes the growing costs of various fringe 
benefits in Canada and their impact on expanding employ-
ment. The empirical évidence is in support of fringe barder 
hypothesis but not until labour turnover costs are added to 
fringe costs. It emphasizes that Canadian data on fringe 
benefits and overtime are extremely inadéquate therefore, 
at the présent time, no conclusive study is possible without 
collecting data on overtime, describing the causes of assigning 
it internally in a factory. This study attempted to fill in this 
gap by suggesting that external factors such as skill shortages 
and capacity output are not significant déterminants of over-
time. 
In the United States, in récent years, considérable concern has been 
expressed about the phenomenon of high unemployment coexisting with 
high incidence of overtime. In 1963, it was estimated that about 7 percent 
of ail manufacturing work was being done on overtime, while unemploy-
ment was in the neighbourhood of 5 percent. Notable labour leaders in 
that country argued in favor of spreading this overtime to create new 
jobs. Walter Reuther, testifying before the Joint Economie Committee, 
estimated that 650,000 additionals 
jobs could be created in 1962 by eli-
minating three-fourth of the existing 
overtime1. In the same year Wall 
HAMEED, S.M.A., Professor of In-
dustrial Relations, Faculty of Business 
Administration and Commerce, Uni-
versity of Alberta 
* I am indebted to Mr. Real Parent of the Canada Department of Labour for 
his help in data processing. 
1
 See Joseph W. GARBARINO, « Fringe Benefits and Overtime as Bamers to 
Expanding Employment », lndusîrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 
April, 1964, pp. 426-442. 
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Street Journal reported that in order to reduce the incidence of overtime 
a bill was in the making which would require double time for overtime 2. 
In Canada, during the period 1957-65, average annual unemploy-
ment exceeded 5 percent, ranging between 3.9 and 7.2 percent3. During 
the same period, costs of overtime shift and other payments averaged 9 
percent of payroU, actually increasing in the manufacturing sector from 
3.2 percent in 1957 to 5.2 percent in 1965 4. But surprisingly the argu-
ment about spreading overtime to create new jobs did not receive as much 
public attention in Canada as it did in the United States. Certainly a new 
dimension in this argument, namely the costs of fringe benefits as a 
barrier to expanding employment has featured nowhere in Canadian 
literature. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the growing cost 
of various fringe benefits in Canada has tended to work as a barrier 
against expanding employment. Such an enquiry, as developed in the 
United States, has been termed the « fringe barrier » hypothesis. It 
states that with an increase in the cost of employee-related benefits, rel-
ative to direct wages, employers find it economical to restrict employ-
ment in favor of overtime. 
Costs of fringe benefits in Canada are increasing as a resuit of 
payments required by law (such as unemployment insurance, workmen's 
compensation and old âge security) and collectively bargained fringe 
benefits (which include paid vacations, statutory holidays, rest periods, 
pension plans, group life insurance, survivor benefits, severance pay, 
spécial bonuses and free meals.5. The latter set of fringe benefits were 
mainly bargained as non-wage items during the wage-freeze of the World 
War II period. The trend toward longer paid absence, in particular, has 
continued ever since. 
2
 The Wall Street Journal, Pacific Coast éd., May 14, 1963, p. 1, quoted in 
GARBARINO Ibid. 
3
 Sylvia OSTRY, Unemployment in Canada, D.B.S. 1968, p. 18. 
4
 See Industrial Relations Counsellors Service, Inc., Fringe Benefit Costs in 
Canada, Toronto (for the years 1957, 59, 61 and 63) and Thorne Group, Fringe 
Benefit Costs in Canada, 1965. 
3 Since workers are generally interested in obtaining overtime, it might be 
regarded as a fringe benefit. But for the purpose of this paper, both conceptually 
and in the manner in which fringe benefit statistics are developed, overtime costs 
are completely independent of fringe benefit costs. For computation of statistics, 
see Note on Statistical Sources appended with this paper. 
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Between 1957 and 1965, cost of payments required by law has in-
creased from 2.6 to 3.2 percent of the payroll in the manufacturing sector 
and from 2.2 to 4.5 percent in the non-manufacturing sector of the eco-
nomy 6. It is suspected that higher percentage increase in the non-manu-
facturing sector may be due to the fact that although employment in 
agriculture, forestry and mining fell in this sector, service producing in-
dustries (transportation, public utilities, trade, finance and service) for 
the first time in the late fifties outstripped employment in manufacturing 
sector. Thèse workers, coincidentally, happened to be white collar workers 
with relatively more libéral provisions for paid absences and other em-
ployée related benefits, compared with the blue collar work force in the 
manufacturing sector. Cost of such legally required payments may con-
tinue to increase as new social security législation (such as Canada Pen-
sion Plan, 1966 and Medicare, 1968) cover larger numbers of the work 
force. 
There are no Canadian studies which analyze the employment im-
pact of financing such public and private social security programs and 
other colléetively bargained fringe benefits. The problem seems to be 
two-fold. First, it appears that one of the immédiate research needs in 
this area is to examine whether increasing cost of fringe benefits has 
limited employment in favour of overtime. Secondly, public policy im-
plications of this research may be studied subsequently to détermine 
whether législative measures (such as double time for overtime) should 
be considered to offset the impact, if any. The scope of this study is not 
broad enough to make meaningful public policy recommendations as 
they must also dépend on a comprehensive analysis of other institutional, 
économie and political factors affecting législative action. 
A MODEL 
A régression model has been constructed to test this hypothesis and 
to examine the Garbarino-MacDonald controversy over breakeven point, 
after which overtime becomes a preferred option 7. In the détermination 
of the breakeven point, MacDonald has considered the cost of labour 
turnover a crucial variable and suggested that Garbarino could réfute the 
existence of fringe barrier because he did not include the cost of labour 
6
 Industrial Relations Counsellors Service, Inc., and Thorne Group (ïbid.). 
7 Joseph L. GARBARINO (op. cit.) and Robert M. MACDONALD, «The Fringe 
Barrier Hypothesis and Overtime Behavior », Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
Vol. 19, No. 4 (July, 1966), pp. 562-569. 
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turnover in his model. Our model is in agreement with MacDonald and 
therefore includes yearly estimâtes of labour turnover with other explo-
ratory variables. The « fringe barrier » hypothesis is tested by examining 
the following relationships which may be considered as its essential com-
ponents. 
(1) It is hypothesized that during the nine-year period under study 
(1957-1965), costs of fringe benefits as a percentage of payroll, F (which 
are equal to costs of fringe benefits required by law, R plus the costs of 
collectively bargained fringe costs, B) hâve worked as a disincentive for 
employers in hiring additional workers (AE). The proposition is not in 
the nature of establishing a causality but indicative of an économie choice. 
That is, higher fringe benefit costs compared with the costs of overtime 
do not cause a réduction in employment per se, because causality dépends 
to a much greater extent on other considérations such as levels of gross 
output and stock of business capital. In a more spécifie context, it means 
that although fringe costs and employment statistics in Canadian manu-
facturing increased in an absolute sensé8, an indeterminate number of 
workers may hâve failed to find jobs if employers decided to choose over-
time costs rather than hire additional workers who add employee-related 
fringe costs to the payroll. The purpose of this research is to analyze 
relative rather than absolute impact of fringe costs on employment. Thus, 
if such a phenomenon has existed in the Canadian manufacturing sector, 
we should expect a négative corrélation coefficient between F. and AE. 
(a) Employers undertake premium payment on overtime hours when 
they exceed their normal schedule of production intending to achieve 
capacity level of output. Five measures of productive capacity hâve been 
used in the United States with varying degrees of success in collecting 
data on this économie indicator9. Garbarino used capacity data from 
McGraw-Hill surveys to indicate the relationship between the use of 
overtime and productive capacity. No such statistics are available in Ca-
nada but for the purpose of this paper, two of the five methods referred 
8
 Employment in manufacturing increased from 1,340,925 in 1957 to 1,482,516 
in 1965 (Employment and Payroll, D.B.S.) ; total costs of fringe benefits also 
increased in absolute dollar terms from 774 million to roughly 2 billion during the 
same period (calculations based on statistics from Industrial Relations Counsellors 
Service, Inc. op. cit.). 
9
 For detailed discussion of thèse methods, see Almarin PHILLIPS, «Industrial 
Capacity : An Appraisal of Measures of Capacity », American Economie Review, 
Vol. LUI, No. 2 (May 1963). 
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to above, were tried and statistics from one of the more successful me-
thods were used 10. 
Apart from an expected positive corrélation between capacity output 
and overtime, one might also visualize that employers faced with a pro-
blem of skill shortages would tend to use overtime as an alternative. But 
how do we measure skill shortages ? The concept which cornes closest to 
measuring skill shortages is structural unemployment, although the latter 
is caused by major shifts in consumer demand, technological changes, 
exhaustion of natural resources and changes in the organization of in-
dustry n . Measurement of structural unemployment itself is fairly con-
troversial but in one of their studies, Department of Manpower and Im-
migration defined it as a differential between job vacancy and unemploy-
ment rates 12. 
A third and crucial variable for this study, affecting the use of over-
time, is the cost of fringe benefits itself. Therefore, it may now be hypo-
thesized that if variations in overtime cost (O) , during the period under 
study, can be accounted for by fringe costs, in equal or greater measure, 
than capacity output (C) or structural unemployment (u), we would find 
an indirect évidence of the existence of fringe barrier hypothesis. 
(b) Since both overtime and fringe benefits are cost items to an employer 
and mutually exclusive by définition and by the manner in which sta-
tistics were computed, it is implicit in the fringe barrier phenomenon 
that an employer has a certain degree of freedom in substituting one 
for the other. On this assumption, a positive and significant corrélation 
between thèse two factors may be interpreted as an existence of a certain 
degree of substitution. 
(2) It is also implicit in the hypothesis that employers, in their décision 
to minimize costs, compare not only the costs of fringe benefits but the 
combination of fringe costs plus the cost of adding new employées (Le., 
the cost of labour turnover) with the overtime cost. Garbarino's estimâtes 
showed overtime costs to be much more expensive than fringe costs 
because he disregarded turnover costs. Thus, it is MacDonald's conten-
tion that the fringe barrier hypothesis was never adequately tested by 
!0 See Note on Statistical Sources for the method of Computing capacity output 
data. 
11
 H. D. WOODS and Sylvia OSTRY, Labour Policy and Labour Economies in 
Canada, Toronto, MacMillan of Canada, 1962, pp. 377-78. 
12
 See Note on Statistical Sources. 
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Garbarino. He cites other studies in support of his position that the cost 
of adding employées (labour turnover plus fringe benefits) is greater 
than cost of paying overtime 13. This may be tested in a multiple ré-
gression analysis by adding labour turnover cost, T to fringe cost and 
observe change, if any, in the percentage of variation explained in the 
dépendent variable, AE. 
(3) Another way of testing the hypothesis, although negatively, is to 
suggest that during the same period, overtime cost, O, has not been an 
important considération in hiring additional workers, AE, thus implying 
a lack of significant corrélation between O and AE. 
It should be sufficient to test the above three components of the 
hypothesis to establish validity of fringe barrier phenomenon. But further 
extensions of the same argument may also be tested by examining the 
behaviour and détermination of overtime. Additional sub-hypotheses are 
therefore presented below : 
(4) There are no conclusive studies on the behaviour and détermination 
of overtime. Consequently, Garbarino seems to be of the opinion that 
overtime occurs on account of the internai factory circumstances, such 
as equipment breakdowns, absenteeism, errors in schedules plus a few 
other factors like union work rules and skill shortages. MacDonald agrées 
that the above factors do influence overtime but questions the rôle of 
work rules and skill shortages as the déterminants of the change in over-
time since 1956. Since the existing statistics on overtime are still inadé-
quate and do not mention the reasons or relative importance of any of 
the internai factors which are responsable in assigning overtime in a 
plant, it is not possible to settle the above controversy. 
Internai factory bottlenecks cannot be analyzed till the statistics on 
spécifie causes of assigning overtime are collected. But in a limited sensé 
it is quite possible to analyze at a micro level, the change in union work 
rules affecting overtime. The following hypothèses are expected to bring 
out the relative importance of fringe costs in comparison with the level 
of capacity output or skill shortages. 
STATISTICAL ESTIMATES 
A number of équations, relating to the foregoing hypothèses were 
empirically estimated. Results of only two of thèse équations are being 
13
 J. Ross WETZEL, « Current Developments in Factory Overtime », Employ-
ment and Earnings, May 1965, pp. vii-viii. 
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presented in the following paragraphs. Equation (1) testing hypothèses 
(1) to (3) is estimated with the rate of change of employment (AE) as 
a dépendent variable and fringe cost required by law (R), collectively 
bargained fringe cost (B), cost of labor turnover (T), overtime cost (O) 
and capacity output (C) as explanatory variables. In Equation (2) O is 
regressed against total fringe costs (F), structural unemployment (u) and 
capacity output (C) to test (a) and (b) of hypothesis 4. Thèse two équa-
tions were estimated, using aggregative annual data 14. Results of the 
application of multiple corrélation technique are provided below, with 
sampling errors noted within parenthèses : — 
AEt = a + bj Rt + b2 Bt 4- b3 Tt + b4 Ot + b5 C t . . . (1) 
= 4.80918 - 0.52415 R - 0.07749 B - 0.16736 T 
(.14641) (.07606) (.05908) 
+ 0.044251 O + 0.35221 C 
(.06588) (.06592) 
a + bx F + b2 ut + b3 C . . . . (2) 
26.01527 + 0.54866 F - .00125 u + .20124 C 
(.24223) (.10257) (.40407) 
Tables 1 and 2 contain further détails of estimating équations (1) and 
(2) respectively, with partial corrélation coefficients provided at the bot-
tom. A brief explanation of thèse statistical estimâtes are as follows : — 
(1). The first élément of the fringe barrier hypothesis, namely, the in-
fluence of fringe costs in the décision to hire additional workers has 
received inconclusive support. It may be observed (Table 1) that in mul-
tiple corrélation analysis, combined cost of fringe benefits (i.e., R and 
B) has no relationship with the rate of change in employment (AE). 
(2). However, as a second élément of the fringe hypothesis, if we include 
the cost of labour turnover, the relationship becomes quite significant, 
giving us a corrélation coefficient of .72. It may be recalled that in the 
Garbarino-MacDonald controversy, labour turnover cost was considered 
important in the détermination of breakeven point. Our empirical results 
for the Canadian manufacturing sector during the period 1957-1965, 
suggest that fringe costs by themselves are not important in the décision 
O 
t 
14
 See Note on Statistical Sources. 
TABLE 1 
Results of Régression of R,B,T,0, and C on A E (1957-1965) 
A E = a + b] 
Estimât ed Régression Coefficients of : 
R + b B + b, T + b O + b C 
t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 t 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Constant 
Term 
a 
Fringe Cost 
Required 
by Law 
b
.
R 
Collectiveîy 
Bargained 
Fringe Cost 
bJB 
Labour 
Turnover 
Cost 
Overtime 
Cost 
bp 
Capacity 
Output 
b.C 
R and B 100.50540 -.03763 .03174 
R,B and T 114.69161 .07151 .00040 .24247 
R,B,T and O 
-30.82959 .04902 -.01622 .24567 .02745 
R,B,T,0, and C 4.80918 -.52415 -.07749 -.16736 .04251 .35221 
\ (.14641) (.07606) (.05908) (.06588) (.06592) 
D-W 2.69962 
Corrélation Between 
/\ E and R 
A E and B 
A E and T 
A E and O 
A E and C 
Partial Corrélation Coefficients 
Variables Held Constant 
B,T,0,C 
R,T,0,C 
R,B,0,C 
R,B,T,C 
R,B,T,0 
Corrélation (rp) 
Coefficients of Partial 
- . 45 
- .26 
- .56 
.17 
.51 
TABLE 2 
Results of Régression of F,u and C on O (1957-1965) 
O + b t F b u + b C 
2 t 3 t 
Estimated Régression Coefficients of 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Constant 
Term 
a 
Total Fringe 
Costs 
Structural 
Unemployment 
b2u 
Capacity 
Output 
Simple /Multiple 
Corrélation 
Coefficients 
F 31.86500 .69358 — — .96 
F and u 32.53570 .71559 -.03297 — .96 
F, u and C 26.01527 .54866 -.00125 .20124 .97 
S b (.24223) (.10257) (.40407) 
D - W (2.15897) 
Corrélation Between 
O and F 
O and u 
O and C 
Partial Corrélation Coefficients 
Variables Held Constant 
u and C 
F and C 
F and u 
Coefficients of Partial 
Corrélation (rp) 
.38 
-.003 
.13 
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to hire additional workers. But with the addition of labour turnover cost 
to the total cost of fringe benefits, the employer décision on the basis of 
comparative costs and économie logic becomes simpler. The total pack-
age of fringe and turnover costs being greater than overtime cost, he 
would tend to restrict hiring workers in favor of overtime. 
It is interesting to note that in the partial corrélation analysis, when 
costs of labour turnover, overtime and capacity output are held constant, 
legally required fringe benefit costs do seem to influence the hiring of 
additional workers. The sign is also négative, indicating that an increase 
in fringe costs is associated with a decrease in employment. Or in other 
words, fringe costs during the period under study, hâve acted somewhat 
as a barrier in the hiring process. It may also be observed that capacity 
output (C) has shown a respectable partial corrélation (rp = .51) with 
the change in employment (AE). In fact this coefficient of partial corré-
lation is higher than what it is for fringe cost required by law (R). This 
has strong indications that employment décision rests primarily on cur-
rent levels of gross product15. 
(3) Regarding the third component of the hypothesis, namely the in-
fluence of overtime cost in hiring additional workers, there is conclusive 
évidence that both in multiple and partial corrélation analyses, it has 
been the least significant variable — accounting for a negligible per-
centage of variation in AE under the former technique and a very low 
partial corrélation coefficient with a wrong sign (r = .17) under the 
latter. Standard errors of régression coefficients (S ) also indicate the 
fact that at 95% confidence interval the true values of régression coeffi-
cients for R, T and C lie in a range defined by two times the standard 
déviation either side of the point estimate. On the other hand, there are 
good chances that true values of coefficients of B and O, containing né-
gative values in the confidence interval may actually be zéro. In other 
words, overtime cost and collectively bargained fringe cost16 hâve no 
measurable influence on the décision to hire additional workers ; whereas 
R, T and C hâve. Eliminating the mention of other variables, we could 
15 For a related discussion on the relationship of various catégories of labour 
input and gross product, see E. KUH, « Income Distribution and Employment Over 
the Business Cycle » in J.S. DUESENBERRY, G. FROMM, L.P. KLEIN and E. KUH 
(eds.) The Brookings Quarterly Econometric Model of the United States, North 
Holland Publishing Company, 1965. 
Ï6 Perhaps unions could be exonerated from the charge of unduly raising the 
cost of collectively bargained fringe benefits — at least to the extent that thèse 
fringe costs do not deter additional employment. 
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simply conclude that fringe cost required by law has a significant négative 
effect on the hiring of additional workers, but overtime cost does not 
hâve any influence whatsoever. 
The next stage of analysis requires an examination of the behaviour 
of overtime. Statistical estimâtes of regressing O against F, u and C are 
helpful in testing the components of the hypothesis that décision to work 
existing work force to its maximum, (i.e. work them overtime) is made on 
the basis of comparative costs involved in paying fringe costs on an ad-
ditional worker as against the cost of paying premium overtime rate mul-
tiplied by the number of overtime hours required. 
On the question of what détermines overtime, the fringe barrier hypo-
thesis provided a few analytical insights. They were described earlier 
and the resutls of testing them empirically may now be analyzed (see 
Table 2) : — 
(a) It may be observed that among the independent variables, explaining 
variation in overtime, fringe cost is the only significant factor. It ex-
plained 93.76 percent variation in overtime cost incurred by the Ca-
nadian manufacturing sector during the nine-year period under study. 
The other two exploratory variables, u and C did not contribute any-
thing. Thus suggesting that two of the most plausible external variables 
are not important in the détermination of overtime and therefore, by 
default, throwing weight in support of the internai production bottlenecks 
(equipment breakdown, absenteeism, union work rules, etc.) as the 
possible factors of causation. 
(b) There is a strong simple corrélation between fringe costs and over-
time (r = .96). Also, in the multiple régression, fringe cost has a sta-
tistically significant régression coefficient, (0.54866) indicating that if 
fringe costs go up by one percent, overtime costs will rise by .55 percent 
(both fringe and overtime costs are percentages of payroll). Thus accepting 
fringe costs as an important influence on overtime (besides the possible 
influence of internai factory bottlenecks which we hâve not been able 
to measure). Since fringe benefits and overtime are cost items to the 
employer who has, at least in theory, an option to substitute overtime 
cost for fringe cost, the above relationship présents a picture of subtitut-
ability in cost décisions of the Canadian manufacturing sector for the 
period under study. A note of caution is imperative hère in view of 
the poor results of partial corrélation analysis. Fringe cost is much less 
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important (r = .38) when unemployment and capacity output are held 
constant. However, lack of influence of u and C on overtime, pointed out 
earlier, is further confirmed 17. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical évidence is in support of fringe barrier hypothesis but 
not until labour turnover costs are added to fringe costs. Fringe costs 
by themselves do not affect employment décision (as shown in multiple 
régression coefficients, Table 1) but (in partial corrélation analysis, bot-
tom of Table 1) it appears that if fringe costs are separately identified as 
those legally required and those bargained collectively, it is only the in-
fluence of the former which seems to hâve some restrictive influence on 
employment. Collectively bargained fringe benefits hâve no influence on 
employment changes. The évidence is not strong enough to advance policy 
recommendations but it may be argued that government may be well ad-
vised to encourage research on the possible impact of passing further so-
cial security législation which may add to the employée related fringe 
costs. This will make overtime a less expensive alternative, inducing the 
employers to restrict additional hiring. It is rather early at this stage to 
suggest législative restrictions on overtime or higher penalty rates. But 
if the burden of employée related fringe cost increases, such a measure 
may become necessary to avoid its adverse effect on expanding employ-
ment. It is, however, important to mention the limitations of the study, 
without basically altering the above conclusions. The following factors 
may somewhat change the perspective of research in this area and em-
phasize the need for collecting and refining data on fringe benefits and 
overtime. 
(1) Canadian data on fringe benefits and overtime are extremely inadé-
quate. Recently, a joint survey on fringe benefits by the Department of 
17
 Non-availability of published data on structural unemployment in Canada 
is responsible for luke warm public policy in labour market adjustment. Similarly, 
private employers also fail to know the extent of skill shortages and the conséquent 
need to adjust the magnitude of overtime. We used some preliminary job vacancy 
statistics and calculated their differentials over unemployment figures. In this exer-
cise it was supposed that there was a certain amount of structural unemployment 
which compelled employers to use overtime as a substitute. Thus it was expected 
that corrélation between Q and u will be significant and positive. But in our sta-
tistical estimâtes u has shown no corrélation. Further research on this variable will 
hâve to wait till reliable job vacancy surveys, currently being conducted by the 
D.B.S., produce meaningful measures of structural unemployment. 
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Labour and Dominion Bureau of Statistics has been started which would 
be of immense help in future studies of this kind. But no conclusive study 
on fringe barrier hypothesis is possible without collecting data on over-
time, describing the causes of assigning it internally in a factory. The 
présent study attempted to fill in this gap by suggesting that external fac-
tors such as skill shortages and capacity output are not significant déter-
minants of overtime. Therefore, by the process of élimination, internai 
factors, as pointed out by Garbarino, may be considered important. A 
study of thèse internai factors plus union work rules may perhaps settle 
this controversy by concluding that overtime is determined independently 
of fringe costs. Hence in the décision to hire additional workers, the 
fringe barrier proposition is not relevant. But till such time thèse data 
are forthcoming, there is no way of refuting the fringe hypothesis. 
(2) The above position may lead future research in this area to modify 
our earlier conclusion to a certain degree. We hâve indicated that there 
is more évidence in support of fringe barrier hypothesis than there is 
against it. Thereby implying that fringe costs hâve been somewhat res-
ponsible in restricting additional employment in the Canadian manu-
facturing sector, during the period under study. But a more fundamental 
issue to examine alongside is to study the basic ingrédients of employ-
ment décision which neither Garbarino nor MacDonald hâve discussed. 
This is in relation to Kuh's findings on employment behaviour over 
business cycle 18. He has successfully demonstrated that the employment 
décision is based on current and lagged levels of gross produce, stock of 
business capital and average work week. The last variable is extremely 
relevant for our study because it indicates the extent to which overtime 
may be required. Thus Kuh has indirectly accepted the importance of 
overtime but not that of fringe benefits in his employment function. Kuh's 
position may therefore be interpreted to mean that if his exploratory 
variables are basically permissive, fringe cost would not be a strong 
barrier. On the other extrême, it is not difficult to envisage that if over-
time premium rate became very high, it will not completely disappear as 
some overtime will hâve to be assigned for internai factory reasons, such 
as absenteeism and union work rules. To this extent, fringe barrier hypo-
thesis is only partially valid, operating in a narrow range. It may not 
restrict employment in the face of high économie activity which requires 
full shift production schedules rather than utilizing a few skilled workers 
on an overtime basis. In this sensé, fringe costs could perhaps be a barrier 
18 E. K U H , op. cit. 
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only in the early phases of an économie recovery, thereon they could only 
be a damper in marginal cases and not a barrier, per se. 
Note on Statistical Sources 
Employment data were obtained from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The 
General Review of Manufacturing, Cat. No. 31-201. Fringe benefit costs (legally 
required and collectively bargained) and overtime costs as percentage of payroll 
were obtained from Industrial Relations Counsellors Service, Inc., and Thorne Group 
for the years 1957, 59, 61, 63 and 65 (extrapolated for the missing years). Labour 
turnover data were taken from Hiring and Séparation Rates in Certain Industries, 
D.B.S. Cat. No. 72-006. Figures in this publication are reported on a monthly basis 
as rates per hundred persons on payroll. They were averaged on an annual basis 
and lower of the two (i.e. of séparation and hiring) was taken as turnover rate. To 
calculate total turnover cost in manufacturing the following formula was used : — 
Labour turnover cost = [Turnover rate] [Employment] 
500 Y-l [500 + AAEWC ] 
AEWC Y 
where 500 is estimated per employée dollar cost of hiring, training, etc. (See Willard 
A. Kerr, « Labour Turnover and its Correlates », Journal of Applied Psychology, 
Vol. XXXI, 4, August, 1947, pp. 366-371 and J. R. Greystoke, C F . Thompson and 
J. J. Murphy, « Labour Turnover Survey », Journal of the Institute of Personnel 
Management, Vol. XXXIV, 321, September 1952, pp. 158-165. 
AEWC is annual employée wage cost which is 52 x average weekly wages and 
salaries, obtained from The General Review of Manufacturing. 
In order to compute capacity output figures, two statistical séries were needed : 
(1) indicies of manufacturing production, (2) net stock of fixed capital. The first 
one was obtained from the Annual Supplément to the Monthly Index of Industrial 
Production, D.B.S. Cat. No. 61-005 ; and the second one from the Estimâtes of 
Fixed Capital Flows and Stocks, Manufacturing, D.B.S. (Unpublished date). Ca-
pacity output data were developed by plotting IMP figures for a much longer period 
(1926-1965). A trend Une was calculated for the peak production years and thèse 
values were adjusted for the growth of capital stock. A second method was also 
tried by calculating capital/output ratios for non-recession years and trend values 
were obtained for thèse years, to be subsequently adjusted by IMP. The second 
method required log relationship in calculating trend values and appeared some-
what unrealistic compared with the capacity output figures obtained through the 
first method. Hence it was rejected. For further détails on concept and use of 
capacity output see Charles L. Shultze, «Use of Capacity Measures for Short-Run 
Economie Analysis », AER, Vol. LUI, No. 2, May 1963 ; and Frank DeLeeuw, 
«: The Concept of Capacity », Journal of the American Statistical Association, De-
cember 1962. 
Structural unemployment figures were obtained from the Department of Man-
power and Immigration from one of their projects on Measurement of Structural 
Unemployment ( Unpublished ). 
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L'IMPACT DES AVANTAGES D'APPOINT SUR L'EMPLOI 
DANS L'INDUSTRIE MANUFACTURIÈRE CANADIENNE 
L'objet de cet article est de vérifier si l'accroissement constant du coût des 
avantages d'appoint au Canada tend à freiner l'expansion de l'emploi. On a fait aux 
États-Unis une telle enquête qui visait à rendre compte jusqu'à quel point l'augmen-
tation de ces mesures (fringe barrier hypothesis) pouvaient faire obstacle à l'expan-
sion de l'emploi. Il s'agit au fond d'une hypothèse de travail qui peut ainsi s'énoncer : 
lorsqu'il y a augmentation du coût des avantages d'appoint accordés aux employés 
par rapport aux salaires directs, les employeurs préfèrent favoriser le travail supplé-
mentaire au détriment de l'expansion de l'emploi. 
L'augmentation du coût des avantages d'appoint au Canada résulte des presta-
tions imposées par la loi (assurance-chômage, accidents du travail, pensions de 
vieillesse), et des avantages d'appoint obtenus par négociation collective, (vacances 
payées, jours fériés, repos intercalaires, indemnité de fin d'emploi, indemnités spé-
ciales, repas gratuits). Cette dernière catégorie d'avantages d'appoint était généra-
lement rangée dans les questions non salariales pendant la période du gel des salaires 
au cours de la deuxième guerre mondiale. C'est ainsi que, par exemple, la tendance à 
accorder des absences rénumérées s'est maintenue depuis cette époque. 
UN MODÈLE 
On a mis au point un modèle de régression afin de vérifier la valeur de cet 
obstacle et on s'est beaucoup intéressé à la controverse Garbarino-MacDonaild con-
cernant le seuil au-delà duquel le travail supplémentaire devient l'option préférée. 
Dans la détermination de ce seuil, MacDonald a considéré le roulement de la main-
d'œuvre comme une variable décisive et laisse entendre que Garbarino pouvait réfuter 
l'existence d'un pareil obstacle parce qu'il ne comprenait pas le coût du roulement 
de la main-d'œuvre dans le modèle. Celle qu'on propose ici est conforme à celle 
de MacDonald et, en conséquence, elle inclut d'année en année les données relatives 
au roulement de la main-d'œuvre en même temps que les autres variables qui ont 
fait l'objet d'études. On a vérifié l'hypothèse en analysant les divers types de rela-
tions suivantes qui en constituent les composants essentiels. 
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(1) On a posé l'hypothèse que, pendant la période de neuf ans (1957-1965) 
qui a fait l'objet d'analyses, le coût des avantages accessoires apprécié en pourcentage 
de la feuille de paie, F (qui comprend le coût des avantages d'appoint imposés par 
la législation, R plus le coût des avantages d'appoint négociés collectivement, B) ont 
eu pour effet de détourner les employeurs de l'embauchage d'employés supplémen-
taire (AE). La proposition n'est pas de nature à établir un lien de causalité, mais 
elle laisse présager un choix fait pour des motifs d'ordre économique. 
(2) Selon MacDonald, Garbarino n'a jamais contrôlé valablement l'hypothèse. 
Il cite à l'appui de son point de vue d'autres études selon lesquelles le coût de 
l'embauche d'employés supplémentaires (roulement de la main-d'œuvre et avantages 
accessoires) dépasse le coût du paiement des heures supplémentaires. On peut 
vérifier ce fait dans une analyse de régression multiple en ajoutant le coût du rou-
lement de la main-d'œuvre, T, au coût des avantages d'appoint pour ensuite observer 
le changement, s'il se produit, dans le pourcentage de variation expliqué dans la 
variable dépendante AE. 
(3) Une autre façon de vérifier l'hypothèse, quoiqu'elle soit négative, c'est de 
supposer que, pendant la même période, le coût du travail supplémentaire O n'a 
pas joué un rôle important dans l'embauchage d'employés additionnels, AE, ce qui 
veut dire qu'il n'y a pas de corrélation vraiment significative entre O et AE. 
LES DONNÉES STATISTIQUES 
D'une façon empirique, on a posé un certain nombre d'équations en regard des 
hypothèses précédentes. Voici le résultat que donnent deux de ces équations. 
A E = a + b R + b B + b T + b O + C 
t 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t t 
= 4.80918 - 0.52415 R - 0.07749 B - 0.16736 T 
(.14641) (.07606) (.05908) 
+ 0.04251 O + 0.35221 C 
(.06588) (.06592) 
O = a + b F + b u + b C 
t 1 t 2 t 3 t 
= 26.01527 + 0.54866 F - .00125 u + .20124 C 
(.24223) (.10257) (.40407) 
Voici maintenant une courte explication de ces données statistiques : 
(1) Le premier élément de l'hypothèse, principalement l'influence du coût des 
avantages d'appoint, dans la décision d'embaucher des employés additionnels ne 
permet pas d'arriver à une conclusion ferme. On peut observer que dans l'analyse 
de corrélation multiple le coût global des avantages d'appoint (c'est-à-dire R et B) 
n'a aucune influence sur le taux de changement dans l'emploi (AE). 
(1) 
(2) 
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(2) Cependant, comme deuxième élément de l'hypothèse si nous y incluons le 
coût du roulement de la main-d'œuvre, le rapport devient fort significatif en donnant 
un coefficient de corrélation de .72. On peut rappeler que, dans la controverse Gar-
barino-MacDonald, le coût du roulement de la main-d'œuvre jouait un rôle important 
dans la détermination du seuil. Les résultats empiriques obtenus en ce qui concerne 
le secteur de l'industrie manufacturière au Canada pendant la période 1957-1965 
ont démontré que, en lui-même, le coût des avantages d'appoint n'a pas une grande 
influence dans la décision d'embaucher des employés additionnels. Mais, quand on 
ajoute le coût du roulement de la main-d'œuvre au coût global des avantages acces-
soires, la décision de l'employeur considérée sous l'angle de la comparaison des coûts 
et de la logique de l'économie devient plus facile. La somme globale du coût des 
avantages d'appoint et du roulement de la main-d'œuvre dépassant le coût du travail 
supplémentaire, l'employeur préfère réduire l'embauchage des travailleurs pour favo-
riser le travail supplémentaire. 
(3) Quand l'on considère le troisième élément de l'hypothèse, c'est-à-dire l'in-
fluence du coût du travail supplémentaire sur l'embauchage d'employés additionnels, 
il faut conclure que, tant dans les analyses de corrélation multiple que partielle, on 
découvre une variable de peu de signification, puisqu'il n'y a qu'un pourcentage de 
variation négligeable dans AE selon les analyses de corrélation multiple et un 
coefficient très bas, dans les analyses de corrélation partielle, soit le signe contraire 
r = .17 selon ces dernières. 
P 
CONCLUSIONS 
Les constatations empiriques ne confirment pas l'hypothèse que les avantages 
d'appoint sont un obstacle à l'expansion de l'emploi tant qu'on n'a pas ajouté à 
leur coût celui du roulement de la main-d'œuvre. Le coût des avantages accessoires 
n'influence pas en soi les décisions en matière d'embauchage, mais il ressort que, 
si l'on distingue le coût des avantages d'appoint imposés par législation de ceux qui 
résultent de la négociation collective, ce n'est que ceux-là qui semblent avoir quelque 
effet négatif sur l'emploi. Les avantages d'appoint obtenus par négociation collective 
n'exercent aucune influence sur les variations dans l'emploi. L'indication n'est pas 
assez marquée pour permettre d'y aller de recommandations de caractère pratique, 
mais on peut soutenir que l'État aurait avantage à faire pousser la recherche sur 
les effets de mesures de sécurité sociale qui sont de nature à accroître le coût des 
avantages d'appoint. Ceci inciterait moins à faire appel au travail supplémentaire 
qui porte les employeurs à restreindre l'embauchage. 
